Neopythagoreismen und Pseudosokratismen im Platonismus der frühen Neuzeit

Der Philosophiebegriff
in der Akademie Marsilio Ficinos

1 Leave a comment on Absatz 1 0 Jens Lemanski

2 Leave a comment on Absatz 2 0 In contemporary debates on what philosophy may be, the discipline is mostly regarded as a mere aggregate of its parts (e. g. epistemology, logic, ethics etc.). Early modern thinkers prefered to base their view of philosophy on a genuine definition of its concept. The Florentine Neoplatonist Marsilio Ficino is no exception to this: He refers explicitly to the Pythagorean and Socratic determination of philosophy as love of wisdom and identifies the latter with a striving for God or the One. This essay traces this conception in Ficino and his closest disciple, Francesco di Zanobi Cattani da Diacceto. Two theses are defended: 1. Ficino’s conception of philosophy is, strictly speaking, neither neoplatonist nor platonist. It should rather be regarded as neopythagorean or Socratic. 2. Diacetto does not follow his teacher’s Pythagorean view of philosophy. He argues against Ficino’s identification of wisdom and God. This leaves space for a conception of human wisdom alien to Ficino and based on an inherent scepticism about the Pythagorean stance in general: Philosophical debates in Florence between 1450 and 1500 did not only concern the harmony of Platonism and Aristotelianism. The evaluation of Pythagoras and his teachings played an important role as well.

Seite 13